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"MEN MADE IT, BUT THEY CAN'T CONTROL IT": IMMIGRATION
POLICY DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION, ITS PARALLELS TO POLICY
TODAY, AND THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING
ABIGAIL E. LANGER

In its landmark 1941 decision, Edwards v. California, the Supreme
Court held that people are themselves instruments of commerce. The
Court's decision not only signaled a dramatic shift in immigrationpolicy,
but also reflected the federal government's desire to control the social and
economic strife during and after the Great Depression. In May 2011, the
Court again decided on issues impacting immigration and economics in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting. Rather than using the Commerce
Clause as they had in past cases, however, the Court decided Whiting
based solely on the statutory language of the Immigration Reform Control
Act and the Legal Arizona Workers Act. Unlike Edwards, where the Court
could not ignore the socio-economic implications of its decision, the
Whiting decision showed the Court's current reluctance to address its
ruling's broader implications. This Note will discuss the social and
economic climates that led to both the Edwards and the Whiting decisions.
It will attempt to contrastthe nuances of economic legal reasoning in postDepression America with those at present, and show that, because of the
similarities, as well as the differences, between the two periods, the
Court's decision in Whiting may have serious detrimental effects on
immigration law, hiring of immigrants in the Southwest, and the American
economy in general.
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"MEN MADE IT, BUT THEY CAN'T CONTROL IT": IMMIGRATION
THE GREAT DEPRESSION, ITS PARALLELS TO POLICY
TODAY, AND THE FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION IN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING

POLICY DURING

ABIGAIL E. LANGER
PROLOGUE

It is 2008, a Monday morning, just when the sun is starting to come up
but nothing is fully lit. You have arrived at the construction site. For the
last six months, you have been at the same site, at the same time, and every
morning, you look at the fourteen-hour day ahead with a mix of frustration
and appreciation. Though the hours are long, and you make what you
know is just barely minimum wage, your pay covers the apartment you
share with other workers with enough left over to send some money home.
You know that every other week, when your foreman hands out the pay
envelopes, everything that you do not need to survive will be sent to your
parents, your brothers and sisters, your wife and your children so they can
eat and sleep for the next two weeks. It is expected that you will send it; it
is necessary that you do. After all, that is why you have come to Arizona,
why you paid the smuggler, in advance and on credit, to take you across
the border in the middle of the night six months ago. Your friends, many
of whom came with you or right before you from the same village in
southwestern Mexico, carry the same burden and share the same unspoken
but palpable fear of what would happen if you ever had to leave.
On Wednesday that same week, your foreman comes over as everyone
unpacks and tells you to stop. He explains that the company for which you
were building new headquarters has declared bankruptcy because of the
subprime mortgage crisis, and that it does not need a brand new high-rise it
cannot afford. The project is over. You will be paid for your work
You never had benefits or an
through today but nothing more.
unemployment package-like almost everyone else on site, you were
employed as an undocumented worker. Your foreman wants you off the
site immediately, and without the company's financing, there will not be
another project anytime soon, if ever. So what now? You cannot use this
job as experience to get another job. After the state passed Section 23-212,
* Princeton University, B.A. 2007; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate
2012. I would like to thank Professor Renee Redman for her invaluable insight and constructive
criticism over the past year. I would also like to thank Caroline Park, Daniel Goren, and Jenna Snow
for their encouragement and patience throughout the drafting process. And, of course, I would like to
thank my family. Any errors contained herein are mine and mine alone.
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employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers can be fined and
shut down. Your last employer does not want anyone to know you or your
coworkers ever lifted a hammer. You do not speak English. Other than
the fanning skills you learned in Mexico, you have no specific skills
beyond what you have learned on-site. You have no papers. Without this
job, you have no money to support yourself and your family, not to
mention to pay off the smuggler who you still owe. This job was the
reason you came here in the first place.
Now you find yourself between the proverbial rock and hard place.
You cannot support your family in Mexico if you return, and if you get
caught crossing the border after having worked illegally you could face
time in a U.S. prison. You cannot get rehired here without exposing
yourself and your employer. So you wait, hoping that the job will start up
again or that your employer finds a new project. But it does not get better.
The economy only gets worse and even the Americans you knew from the
site cannot get work.
What do you do now?
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the leading economic sources, the recession that
threatened the American economy for almost two years is ending.' What
started almost ten years ago with pictures of paper shreds flying through
the air in Enron offices led, in 2007, to the unthinkable: stocks plummeted;
companies collapsed; tens of thousands of American citizens lost not only
their jobs but also their savings and plans for the future. Scandals covered
the front pages of newspapers. As the American economy collapsed, so
did those of countries around the globe. The words on everyone's lips
were "subprime mortgage," a term soon exclusively acquainted with the
death of the housing and real estate markets. The ripple effect of the
housing crash extended to businesses well beyond Wall Street banks and
urban hedge funds; without financing, suburban and rural construction
companies halted jobs in progress and abandoned future projects.
Unfinished buildings across the United States stood as testaments to
companies' rapid desertion. The workers who depended on such projects
were left jobless and without prospects.
But the wasteland of joblessness that construction workers in the
' Still Patchy, American Firms Are Hiring Again but Hold the Cheers, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 13,
2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17906059; see also NAT'L BUREAU EcoN.
RESEARCH,

BUSINESS

CYCLE

DATING

COMMITTEE

REPORT

1

(2010),

available

at

http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.pdf (explaining the economic trough which signaled the "end" of
the recession); John Cassidy, Is The Recession Really Over?, RATIONAL IRRATIONALITY, NEW
YORKER BLOGS (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/09/is-therecession-really-over.html (questioning the reality of the claim that the recession is over).
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United States faced after the 2007 collapse was not a new phenomenon to
many Americans. In 1929, the stock market collapsed and led to the Great
Depression of the 1930s-an era of bread lines, railroad car hopping, and
squatters' camps. Some of the most poignant images of the Great
Depression come from John Steinbeck's now-iconic novel, The Grapes of
Steinbeck's tale of a family's journey from their failed
Wrath.2
Midwestern farm to California's promised land mirrored the stories of
many Americans. Farmers in the Southwest faced a double threat: from
the banks that they were indebted to for seed, machinery and livestock, and
from nature itself.3 As credit collapsed and local banks felt the economic
strain, farms were foreclosed, and, as Steinbeck explained, farmers and
their families were forced west, hoping to find work in California.
The migration of the 1930s farmer to find work created a legal
dilemma virtually unknown in the United States: what should be done with
the migrating citizen worker? States, concerned that their own citizens
would be overtaken by the influx of jobless outsiders, passed legislation
that excluded indigent persons from crossing their borders.5 Such laws
were enacted as a response to what the Attorney General of California
described as a time of "near crisis in the migrant problem."6 Legislation,
such as California's Health and Welfare Code Section 2615,7 sought to
check the growing populations of indigents by criminalizing the process of
bringing them across state lines. Arguments against such laws culminated
in the landmark Supreme Court decision Edwards v. Calhfornia8 which
ultimately determined that movement of people constituted interstate
commerce and that no state could regulate citizens' free movement within

2 JOHN

STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH I (Viking Press 1965) (1939).
3Id. at 3 ("The surface of the earth crusted, a thin hard crust, and as the sky became pale, so the
earth became pale, pink in the red country and white in the grey country.").
4 In Steinbeck's novel, owners and farmers alike faced grim prospects:
"We're sorry" said the owner men. "The bank, the fifty-thousand-acre
landowner, can't be responsible. You're on land that isn't yours. Once over the line
may you can pick cotton in the fall. Maybe you can go on relief. Why don't you go
on west to California? There's work there, and it never gets cold. Why, you can
reach out anywhere and pick an orange. Why, there's always some kind of crop to
work in. Why don't you go there?" And the owner men started their cars and rolled
away.
Id.at 34.
s Connecticut, New York, Vermont, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Ohio all passed anti-migrant
legislation, which was called into question at the same time as California's law was questioned in
Edwards v. California. Brief of the Attorney General for the State of California as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 16, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (No. 17), 1941 WL 52965, at
*33-34.
'Id. at *24.
1937 Cal. Stat. 1102 ("Every person, firm, or corporation, or officer or agent thereof that brings
or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State, knowing him
to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
'314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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States.9

the United
Edwards declared state regulation of citizen migrants unconstitutional,
but neither the question presented in the case nor the decision addressed
the issue, as present in the 1930s as it is today, of whether a state could
regulate incoming non-citizen migrants. Throughout the twentieth century,
the United States has reformed and re-reformed immigration policy, but
neither the Supreme Court nor the government agencies in charge of
immigration (at present, the Department of Homeland Security and the
Executive Office for Immigration Review) have declared a bright line on
states' ability to regulate the movement of non-citizen immigrants as the
Court did in Edwards. Created in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality
Act ("the Act")-as enforced today by Executive agencies-attempts to
prevent undocumented migration into the United States.' 0 The Act
explicitly details the admissibility ramifications of working in the United
States as an undocumented immigrant." Further, in 1986, Congress passed
the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA").12 Amending the Act,
IRCA places the power to regulate undocumented workers squarely with
the federal government. 3 Yet, even with seemingly explicit direction from
the federal government, regulation of migrant workers is consistently
challenged by states attempting, as California did in the 1930s, to tailor
such regulation to their specific needs.
While Edwards remains good law, and, as will be described later in
this Note, a significant influence on immigration and Commerce Clause
litigation today, its legacy does not include an explicit determination of
states' abilities to manage populations of undocumented immigrant
workers. In the past five years, growing discontent with the economy and
the government's inability to effectively police the southern borders has
led states to enact legislation attempting to stem immigration and protect

9

Id. at 166.
'o 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13)(A) (2006) ("The terms 'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect
to an alien, the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer.").
" 8 U.S.C. § 1l82(a)(5)(A)(i) (2006) ("Any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the
purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has
determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that (I) there are not
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an alien described
in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and admission to the United States and
at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (II) the employment of
such alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States
similarly employed.").
2 Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
" Id. § 101(h)(2) ("The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.").
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local laborers. 14 The most prominent of such legislation is Arizona
Revised Statutes Section 23-212, the Legal Arizona Workers Act.' 5 And,
just as California's regulation of movement was challenged in Edwards,
so, today, was Arizona's attempt to police movement across its borders.
Importantly, though, both to the subject of this Note and to the general
discussion of immigration policy, the challenge to Arizona's statute in
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting16 was not decided under the Commerce
Clause, as was Edwards, but was rather determined as a preemption issue.
From a policy perspective, this is a vital distinction. While the states
enacting anti-immigrant legislation cite protection of employment as their
predominant interest,' 7 the federal government has not attacked such
statutes as violations of the Commerce Clause. The question of who
should regulate undocumented migrant workers, and the answer that the
Supreme Court gave on May 26, 2011, are instead directed at the very
heart of federalism. Though decided on seemingly political and statutory
lines, the Court's decision presents an equivalent shift in social policy to
that which its decision in Edwards did almost a century ago.
This Note examines the economic and social background behind the
challenge to Section 23-212 in Whiting, and attempts to project into the
future of immigration policy based on the Court's recent decision. This
Note posits that the holding for the Respondents (declaring the statute
constitutional) may have substantially detrimental effects on the ability of
both states and the federal government to regulate the movement of
undocumented immigrant workers, leading to a panoply of isolationist state
policies. Such policies could lead the United States further away from a
Depression, but could also, as was strongly argued in Justice Breyer's and
Justice Sotomayor's respective dissents," disrupt the federalism balance.
This Note does not disregard the weighty effects that an opposite
decision from the Court could have engendered. Had the Court decided in
favor of the Petitioner, the decision may still have failed to support a
successful regeneration of the collapsed construction economy in the
American southwest, leaving undocumented, documented, and citizen
workers similarly jobless. Yet, this Note takes the position that the
14 Eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 et. seq. (2010). For other states' criticism of the
Arizona statute, see S.C. Res. 113, 2009-2010 Leg. (Cal. 2010) and H.J. Res. 119, 96th Gen. Assemb.
(Ill. 2010).
" ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A) (2010) ("An employer shall not knowingly employ an
unauthorized alien. If, in the case when an employer uses a contract, subcontract or other independent
contractor agreement to obtain the labor of an alien in this state, the employer knowingly contracts with
an unauthorized alien or with a person who employs or contracts with an unauthorized alien to perform
the labor, the employer violates this subsection.").
16Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115, 2011 WL 2039365 (U.S. May 26, 2011).
17Brief for Senator Russell Pearce as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States v. Whiting (2010) (No. 09-115), 2010 WL 4312793 at *3.
" Whiting, 2011 WL 2039365, at *17 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at *28 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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economic consequences of the majority opinion far outweigh those
exposed by the Petitioner's claim, and that it is possible, even in the weeks
immediately following the decision, to see the dangerous imbalance that
the decision has created in immigration regulation. This Note, with respect
for the statutory analysis relied upon by the Justices in the majority,
disagrees with the decision, based as it appears to be, in political and
textual logic, and not on socio-economic common sense.
II. IMMIGRATION POLICY DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION
A. Edwards v. California
In order to fully explore the parallels and distinctions between how the
United States viewed migration for employment during the Great
Depression and how it views it today, it is useful to examine the sociopolitical background behind California's intentions in enacting Section
2615, the state statute which created the foundation for the constitutional
challenge in Edwards.
In December 1939, Fred Edwards left California and traveled to Texas
where he picked up his brother-in-law, Frank Duncan, to bring him back to
California to live in the Edwards's home.' 9 At the time that Edwards
arrived to collect him, Duncan was unemployed, and had been working
sporadically for New Deal projects, such as the Works Progress
Administration. 20 He neither had a job waiting for him in California nor
resources, beyond Edwards and his wife, to obtain one. 2 1 Duncan was not
unemployed for long, however; he only stayed with the Edwards for ten
days before obtaining financial assistance from another government
program, the Farm Security Administration.2 2 Yet, for those ten days he
was an indigent migrant, and, under California's Welfare and Institutions
Code,23 Edwards was criminally responsible for transporting him into the
state.24 Edwards appealed his conviction under the statute, but it was
affirmed by the Superior Court of Yuba County as a legitimate exercise of
California's police power.2 5
The superior court's ruling was not surprising, given both the general
fear of migrating indigents during the Great Depression and California's
legislative history of statutes barring indigents from entering the state.
19Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 165 (1941).
20

d

21Id. at

165-66.
22Id. at 165.
23CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2615 (enacted 1937) ("Every person, firm or corporation, or
officer or agent thereof that brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a
resident of the State, knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.").
24

Edwards,314 U.S. at 166.

25id
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Proponents of the statute argued its place in legislative tradition since
1860,26 and the overwhelming need to protect the employment of
California citizens in a time of economic crisis.27 The Attorney General, in
his amicus curiae brief to the Court, explained the statute in terms of
preservation, not exclusion, and made an important distinction between the
state's barring of those only who were indigent at the time of their entry
and barring indigents as a class of residents. 2 8 The statute, as the Attorney
General explained it, was not a fortuneteller; it did not propose to look into
the specific futures of those who would become indigent after coming to
California. The legislation was not on its face, therefore, explicitly
discriminatory; it was designed to apply broadly.29 But, in effect, it was
clearly discriminatory.
There were distinct populations coming to
California in search of work, and while they were not easily identifiable by
race or nationality, the idea of the "Okie" was so strong that Section 2615
was commonly referred to as the "Anti-Okie Law."3 o The Attorney
General placed the population of migrant workers, farmers predominantly
from the southwestern states, in the category of "cheap, unskilled labor," '
the migration of whom, he argued, the federal government similarly
regulated. The Attorney General continually emphasized that the law was
not meant to exclude individuals, but to prevent the intentional bringing of
such laborers into an economy already in crisis.32 While the Attorney
General's argument echoed the fears that many Americans harbored as
jobs dwindled, California's solution was in practice discriminatory, based,
as it was, in the tradition of excluding "inferior" groups, or races.
Ultimately, the Court held that California could not regulate the migration
of citizens, because people constituted commerce, and states could not
interfere with commerce with such blatant discrimination.
Though the holding in Edwards was ground-breaking, the debate
surrounding immigration and the Commerce Clause was not a new one.
Since the Framers discussed commerce in the drafting of the Constitution,
federalism and the Commerce Clause have been at the forefront of
immigration law.
Immigration into the newly created United States was encouraged in
2 See 1860 Cal. Stat. 213; 1901 Cal. Stat. 636; 1933 Cal. Stat. 2005 (showing the traditional trend
of anti-indigent legislation passed since 1860 in California).
27 Brief of the Attorney General for the State of California,
supra note 5, at *24.
2

Id at *26-28.

29Id.

at 28 ("The term [indigent] is not limited to persons who are physically or mentally
incapacitated but is broad enough to include persons who from any cause are in a destitute condition.").
"oOKLA. HISTORICAL SOC'Y, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLAHOMA HISTORY AND CULTURE (2007),

http://digital.library.okstate.edu/encyclopedia/entries/O/OK007.html.
31 Brief of the Attorney General for the State of California, supranote 5, at *28.
32 See id.at *27 ("The statute does not purport to exclude
indigent persons from the State. Rather,
the offense consists in the act of brining, or assisting in bringing non-resident indigents into the State
with knowledge of indigency.").
3 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 165 (1941).
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the late eighteenth century,34 and immigration continued to be encouraged
as American borders grew and the government wanted American presence
in the West to expand with them, but the cases that the Supreme Court
handled in the middle of the nineteenth century reflected a backlash against
the very people whom America welcomed as a fledgling nation. States
passed laws requiring record-keeping, levying taxes,36 and imposing
docking restrictions 37 in attempts to restrict access across their borders.
Arguments for such laws were rooted in state police powers and state
interests in the health and welfare of the citizenry, but lurking behind each
statute was the distrust of foreign nationals, arriving by the boatload
throughout the nineteenth century, looking to share the same work as those
already settled.
The Court debated, both within its chambers and with other courts, the
proper method with which to analyze these statutes. Mostly, the Court
struggled with the definition of commerce, and the exclusive power that
the Framers had created for the federal government to govern it.
In a landmark decision, the Court reasoned in Gibbons v. Ogden" that
the federal power to regulate commerce was a broad one, and that it
extended to "every species of commercial intercourse."39 Though not
directly dealing with the migration of people in that case, the Court
nevertheless established the standard by which later cases, most notably
New York v. Miln4 0 and Smith v. Turner,4 1 defined commerce and the
power to regulate it. In Gibbons, the Court grappled with a New York
statute that gave exclusive control of marine navigation between New York
and New Jersey to one shipping company.42 In determining the invalidity
of the statute, the Court reasoned that "[i]f there were no power in the
general government to control this extreme belligerent legislation of the
States, the powers of the government were essentially deficient, in a most
important and interesting particular."A3 Gibbons stressed the essential
nature of unity in governing commerce and established the foundation for
Commerce Clause analysis by holding that New York could not create a
monopoly for one of its own shipping companies because it interfered with
the regulation of instruments used for commerce.
Just more than a decade later, in Miln, the Court re-visited the
3

'New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 114 (1837).
1Id. at 102.
36 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 283 (1849).
3

37Id.

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 193.
436 U.S. (ll Pet.) 102, 102 (1837).
4' 48 U.S. at 283.
42 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 5-6.
4
1Id. at 5.
" Id. at 22.
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Commerce Clause, directly dealing with the movement of foreign
individuals into the United States. 45 The Court faced a more nuanced
commercial context in Miln than it had in Gibbons, but its analysis was
firmly grounded in the definitional boundaries of commerce established in
Gibbons.46 The Court reviewed a New York statute that required the
master of every vessel entering New York harbor to create a record for
each passenger on board. 47 Arguing that the statute was an extension of
the state's police power, the City of New York explained that every state
has an unquestionable right to require a register of names of the persons
who cross its borders and who reside therein, whether permanently or
temporarily. 48 The Court agreed, dismissing Miln's argument that the
statute was a ban on immigration as a whole, 4 9 and establishing the
principle that people are not the subjects of commerce, and that therefore
their movement does not fall under federal governance.so
Importantly, the Court in Miln also established a definition of
pauperism that played an important role in the foundations of immigration
law and resonated strongly in Edwards-era legal scholarship. The Court
reasoned that, by the same logic that allowed states to exclude infected
persons or goods that endangered citizens of the states, states could
exclude paupers, as they would add to the burden of taxation.5 ' Nothing
was more essentially a state function, the Court found, than the regulation
of any class of individuals who threaten to endanger the safety or the
chargeability of the state's citizens.52 Thus, paupers were singled out in
the Miln holding. Even though the Court held in favor of states regulating
all individuals moving across borders, it specifically noted its acceptance
of the regulation of paupers as a dangerous class.
The progression throughout the nineteenth century of debate
surrounding the states' ability to regulate commerce continued in the
Court's 1849 decision of Smith v. Turner.S4 Unlike Gibbons and Miln,
Turner reviewed two statutes, one from New York and one from
Massachusetts, both of which levied an actual tax on incoming travelers.ss
Notably, the Massachusetts statute directly raised the tax (discussed as a
"bond") to one thousand dollars for paupers ("as well as for any lunatic,

4s Miln,
46

36 U.S. at 102.

id.

4
4

1 d. at 151.
1Id. at 152-53.

'o ld. at 142.
sId. at 147-48.
sId at 148.
s3Id.
5448 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
" Id. at 283-85.
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idiot, maimed, aged, or infirm person").56 The Court, contrary to Milnalthough the Petitioners claimed that the case presented the same question
as Miln-held that the statutes undermined the Constitution and were void
as inappropriate regulation of interstate commerce. 57 While the Court
made the distinction between the facts before it in Turner and the situation
in Miln without explicitly naming the movement of persons as commerce,
the subtext of the decision makes this distinction. The Court reasoned that
a state cannot control foreign commerce but that it can affect it through
regulation of such state-controlled areas as property taxes and healthcare
But the Court found that the transportation of passengers,
interests.
regardless of purpose, is a federally governed sphere. 9 The Court
reasoned that "no one has yet drawn the line clearly, because, perhaps, no
one can draw it, between the Commercial power of the union and the
municipal power of the states."60 This statement cut to the heart of the
federalism issue that the Court had attempted to resolve throughout the
decades leading to the abolition of slavery in 1865 .6' Though the Court
saw specific instances where foreign migrants constituted state-regulated
health and financial risks, and recognized more generally where passengers
were defined as commercial instruments, the difficulty of defining
immigration for the purposes of federalism remained.
Thus, when Edwards arose eighty years after the abolition of slavery
and almost a century after Turner was decided, it faced an unresolved issue
of defining the interstate migrant. The Court established Edwards's place
in the debate over the Commerce Clause, using Miln as its definitional
benchmark.62 Yet the Court distinguished the California legislation in
Edwards from the New York statute in Miln, placing the treatment of
migrant workers under federal regulation.6 ' The Court dismissed the
California Attorney General's arguments for the economic protection of
state workers, and established the new benchmark for federalist analysis of
immigration even though it dealt exclusively with citizen migrants.
The decision marked a new era for both commercial and immigration
law. It began the legal dehumanization of the migrant worker, even though
such workers were U.S. citizens and therefore entitled to constitutional
rights. It negated any personal empathy the California Attorney General
attempted to solicit for the citizens of California and replaced it with a
stark reality: The transport of people constitutes commerce, and as such it
6

Id. at 285.
s7 Id. at 283.
*Id
59

at 402.

Id. at 405 ("The transportation of passengers is regulated by Congress.").
6 Id at 402.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XIll.
62 New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 102, 102 (1837).
63 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941).
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is a federal concern. Steinbeck's dustbowl farmer, his "Okie,"6 became a
pawn, a member of a faceless mass, and the concept of migrants not only
as means of commerce, but also as instruments of commerce themselves,
has continued for the last seventy years, despite multiple wholesale
revisions of federal immigration law.
B. Edwards in Context
Even had the Court adopted the California Attorney General's view of
migrant workers as an "inferior" class and ruled in favor of state
regulation, the social climate of Depression-era California provided little
opportunity for a migrant worker to rise above his so-called inferiority to a
sustainable standard of living. The period from 1900 to 1920 was the
"golden age of American agriculture" in the Midwest,6 5 but when the
wartime demand for food and government buying ended with the
66
Armistice, American farms felt an early start to the Depression. While
urban banks and businesses continued to thrive from the Armistice in 1918
until the stock market crash of 1929, American farms did not share in the
prosperity.6 7 From 1919 to 1921, farm shares increased from about ten
billion dollars to roughly forty-four billion, but then crashed to a
devastating seven billion, a rate that remained low until 1929.
After the stock market crash in 1929, prices that Midwestern and
Southwestern farmers received for their crops plummeted again, reaching
the lowest price seen in the United States since 1899.69 Wheat dropped
from its 1919 high of $2.16 a bushel to a shocking $0.29 in 1931-32, and
during the four years following the crash, farm profits as a whole fell fiftyfive percent.70 Combined with droughts, which stripped the loose, glacial
topsoil from the Great Plains, the farms that had fed the Allied Forces
abroad and America at home during World War I uniformly failed.
The great Midwestern farm failures, in addition to the lack of credit
offered by eastern banks, forced white citizen farmers into the labormarkets of the Southwest and West, which had, prior to the Great
Depression, been predominantly filled with migrant farm laborers from
Mexico. As an example, the lemon and orange orchards of Ventura and
6 STEINBECK, supra note 2, at 280 ("'You gonna see in people's face how they hate you. AnI'll tell you somepin. They hate you 'cause they're scairt . . . You never been called 'Okie' yet? ...
Okie used 'ta mean you was from Oklahoma. Now it means you're a dirty son-of-a-bitch. Okie means
you're scum."').
65 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., NAT'L AGRIC. STAT. SERVICE, USDA's NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS SERVICE: AN EVOLVING STATISTICAL SERVICE FOR AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 8 (1995),
availableat http://www.nass.usda.gov/AboutNASS/evolvingnass.pdf.
66 Id
67 id.

.

68id.
69 Id
70 id.

at 9.
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Santa Barbara counties were traditionally tended by migrant harvesters
who moved around California following the seasons." In those counties,
and elsewhere, the delicate homeostasis between the Mexican worker and
the California farmer was an established one.72 Prior to the Depression,
Mexicans such as Augustus Martinez, a laborer who moved to California
when he was nine years old, were not concerned about the loss of their
jobs. As the seasons came and went, they had fruit to pick across the state.
The mechanization of farm machinery, which reduced the need for
manpower in the Midwest, had not yet reached them. Many such laborers
lived on credit and did not own their housing or transportation.74 Farmers
whose fields the laborers worked on provided adequate, albeit sparse,
housing and transported laborers to and from the orchards.7 ' The laborers,
many of whom considered themselves Americans (regardless of whether
they were naturalized), lived similarly to the Midwestern farmers,
subsisting from season to season. The credit they relied upon, however,
was that of the farmers, not the banks. Thus, when the banks failed and
western farmers lost capital, the trickle-down effect impacted the migrant
laborers immediately. And then the Dust Bowl farmers arrived.
While so-called "Okies" faced discrimination from Californian farmers
and exclusion by California legislators because of their new position in the
already-flooded markets, Mexicans faced similar, and sometimes far
greater, discrimination despite their already-established position in the
Californian agricultural economy.
In federally-funded labor camps,
separate schools were established for Americans and Mexicans. Mexicans
were not allowed to sit in the same rows at movie theaters. Orchard
foremen freely harassed Mexican workers. The crops were as consistent
as they had been prior to 1929, but, after white workers flooded the
Californian market, Mexicans could not move between fields and orchards
and be assured that their credit would be stable from farm to farm.
Unlike the farmers from the Midwest, Mexican migrants did not usually
have their own cars, and therefore could not travel extensive distances
from labor camps to find work.
As their jobs were overtaken or dismissed completely, Mexican
" Interview by Charles L. Todd & Robert Sonkin with Augustus Martinez, in Farm Security
Administration Labor Camp, California (1940), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/S?ammem/
toddbib:@field(DOCID(5146al+5146bl)) (last visited June 5, 2011).
72 Id.

73id.

d
Id.
6 Id.; Interview by Charles L. Todd & Robert Sonkin with Jose Flores, in Farm Security
Administration Labor Camp (1940), http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/S?ammem/toddbib:@field
(DOCID(5145al+5145bl)) (last visited June 5, 2011).
n Interview with Jose Flores, supra note 76.
7 Interview with Augustus Martinez, supra note 71.
79
Id.
74

7s
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laborers faced a once-seemingly impossible option: return to Mexico.
Without work, and without the prospect of either keeping their agricultural
jobs or receiving the benefits of federal programs,o immigrants left the
United States by the tens of thousands. This phenomenon had never
occurred on such a massive scale in U.S. history. In 1932 alone, the
United States admitted less than thirty-six thousand immigrants while one
hundred thousand left.
After nearly eleven thousand bank failures, in 1933 President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt passed several New Deal programs aimed at resurrecting
the agricultural economy: the Federal Farm Loan Act consolidated farm
credit programs to make low-interest loans; the Commodity Credit
Corporation made loans to corn and cotton farmers against their crops so
they could hold the crops for higher prices; and, importantly, the Farm
Bankruptcy Act allowed farmers to defer foreclosure while obtaining new
financing. 82 Ultimately, such reduction and consolidation programs did
result in increased crop prices and reduced foreclosure rates, but tenants,
sharecroppers, and migrant laborers had been irrevocably displaced,
creating an imbalance in the agricultural workforce that was not corrected
until World War II, when farmers and sharecroppers migrated to cities to
work in war-centered industrial jobs.
Thus the Court's 1941 decision in Edwards rebutted the state-level fear
of migrant workers entering markets already at capacity while supporting
the federal need to resurrect agricultural stability through establishment
and regulation of government programs. It is not difficult to see the
parallel between the overwhelmed workers of the 1930s and those of
today, while also recognizing the similar fear of foreign workers that states
today have used to establish legislation regulating their economies in much
the same way as California's Section 2615.
III. IMMIGRATION POLICY IN PRESENT-DAY UNITED STATES
A. Unemployment and the Change in Workforce Demographics
With the causes and effects of the Great Depression on early twentiethcentury immigration policies in mind, a comparison with the current
economic and social climates must involve three primary issues: first, the
type of work in which migrant workers are engaged has changed since the
so When asked if he felt that Mexicans received an equal benefit from government programs
aimed at restarting the economy, Jose Flores stated that he felt that Mexicans, even though they wanted
to be and were good citizens, did not receive the same benefits as white, unemployed migrants.
Interview with Jose Flores, supra note 76.
81

THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 171

(6th ed. 2008).
82 U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supranote 65, at 10.
3 Id. at 11.
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84

193 Os; second, that work is disappearing for immigrants and citizens
alike; 5 and, third, unlike the period during and immediately after the Great
Depression, rather than returning to their countries of origin, unauthorized
immigrants are remaining in the United States, causing remittance rates to
not only remain high, but to actually increase.86 The combination of a high
unemployment rate with a high remittance rate is paradoxical. It seems
unlikely that even when immigrants are not working they can continue to
generate profit substantial enough to send back to their countries of origin.
Yet this is exactly the scenario today. This paradox is at the heart of the
debate surrounding present legislation in favor of tracking undocumented
workers and punishing employers who "knowingly seek out"
undocumented workers in order to avoid hiring either legal immigrants or
U.S. citizens.
High remittance rates are due in part to the type of work in which
immigrants participate. The shift away from agriculture toward industry,
construction specifically, is an indication of what analysts refer to as
"selective amnesty," the self-selection of immigrants seeking workers'
visas who had already entered the American workforce undocumented. In
the 1980s, predictions looking toward a period of economic boom foresaw
the rise of an underclass of workers whose alien status was the primary
reason for their hiring and whose presence would be restricted to limited
88
Those opportunities, in light of the late
professional opportunities.
twentieth-century housing boom, were significantly weighted toward
construction and service.89 Analysts' predictions have only partially come
true, and the restrictions on types of work for unauthorized immigrants
have a very different relationship to the economy than originally foreseen.
Unauthorized immigrants today dominate southwestern construction and
service industries, areas that, like agrarian markets, have fluctuating
seasonal needs, but that, unlike agrarian markets, are quickly and easily
dispensed with in a recession. 90 The "underclass" exists, but federal laws
barricade unregulated hiring of individuals solely for their undocumented
status, or, at the very least, they attempt to do so.91
The most important difference between actual unauthorized migrant
8 JEFFRY S. PASSEL & D'VERA COHN, PEw HISPANIC CENTER, A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED

IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (2009); see also supra text accompanying notes 71-72
(describing examples of migrant workers' primary occupation as harvesters in the 1930s).
85Philip Martin, Recession and Migration: A New Era for Labor Migration?, 43 INT'L
REV. 671, 674 (2009).
MIGRATION
8
6 Id.
87 ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A) (2010).
88 PASSEL & COHN, supra note 84, at
10.

8 Martin, supra note 85, at 686-87.
9 Id. at 674-75.
91Charles D. Smith & Juan E. Mendez, Employer Sanctions and Other Labor Market Restrictions
on Alien Employment: The "Scorched Earth" Approach to Immigration Control, 6 IMMIGR. &
NAT'LITY L. REV. 1, 10 (1983).
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workers in the present and those predicted by 1980s analysts is that the
industries in which unauthorized migrant populations dominate are less
local and more dependent on intangible financial support, such as venture
capital.9 2 Credit-fueled building booms, such as those which occurred in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, provided a substantial need for construction
workers, 93 but tightened credit and falling housing prices in the mid-2000s
stalled building projects across the country and sent unemployment
skyrocketing. 94 From January 2007 to January 2009, the unemployment
rate for construction jobs alone rose from nine percent to twenty-two
percent.95 In light of the dramatic change in employment opportunity, the
unauthorized immigrant was increasingly perceived as a threat to jobs
which American citizens themselves wanted.96
B. Construction over Farming
As previously noted, the work done by undocumented migrant workers
today has shifted as dramatically as the demographics of the workers
themselves. According to a 2009 study, one in ten workers in traditionally
immigrant-heavy states such as California and Arizona is an unauthorized
immigrant.97 In Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico the percentage of
unauthorized immigrant workers reaches as high as 8.9 percent.98 The
changing trend showing higher unemployment rates for undocumented
immigrants results from the overrepresentation of undocumented
immigrants in certain work categories, notably construction,
leisure/service, and agriculture.99 While this Note focuses on the impact of
workers in the construction field because their statistics best represent the
dramatic changes in the last century of immigration, it should not be
overlooked that the seasonal service and agricultural industries continue as
traditional areas that draw high immigrant worker populations. Twentyone percent of undocumented workers are in the construction industry,o
but this has only developed in the last twenty to twenty-five years.
Immigration rates were unintentionally accelerated by the 1986
immigration reforms, creating a population which not only followed crops
and tourists, but which capitalized on the booming American housing and
92Martin, supra note 85, at 688.

9 Id. at 671, 676-77.
9
Id. at 671.
9
Id at 677.
96Andrew J. Elmore, Egalitarianismand Exclusion: U.S. Guest Worker Programs and a NonSubordinationApproach to the Labor-BasedAdmission ofNonprofessionalForeign Nationals,21 GEO.
IMMIG. L.J. 521,525, 567 (2007).
97PASSEL & COHN, supranote 84, at 13.
98 See id (showing, in map form, the percentages of unauthorized migrant workers as a share of
the labor force).
9 Id. at 14.
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construction markets.'0o Secondarily, the 1986 reforms eased the process
for family-based naturalization, creating a space for undocumented
workers to settle where there were already established family members. 102
To date, the United States admits primarily members of already settled
families, and statistics support the projection that undocumented workers
settle primarily in households with at least one naturalized nuclear or
extended family member.' 0 3 Single-member unauthorized immigrant
households make up only thirteen percent of the estimated population.
Following traditional trends, in 2009, Latinos continued to be the
principal source of new labor in the United States, both authorized and
unauthorized. 05 Even despite the reduction in the aggregate workforce
between 2007 and 2009, the native-born Latino workforce increased in
number. 06 This created a two-fold problem: first, the continued growth in
population forced a stalemate in growth opportunities for those immigrants
who were already employed; and second, new additions to already
established first-generation Latino families were more likely to be
unemployed than employed. Accordingly, as the recession reached its first
major trough in 2007, the Latino immigrant community's employment
bubble in the American Southwest was already experiencing a self-created
burst.
Unlike the agrarian-based populations during the Great Depression,
undocumented Latino immigrants in the present are not moving from field
to field. While different states have attracted immigrants from the
traditionally heavily populated states of Texas, California, and New
York, 0 7 immigrants are remaining in the states where either their families
reside or where they first find sustainable labor. Not surprisingly, ninetyfour percent of undocumented workers live in metropolitan areas, 08 which
only further separates undocumented migrant populations from their 1930s
predecessors. Unauthorized immigrants act as if captive, tied to one city or
state and to the industry in which they originally found, or believed they
would find, work. As exemplified by legislation such as Arizona's, U.S.
citizen workers seem threatened by such a concentration of undocumented
immigrants who will work more for less because they cannot leave.' 09 But
101
Martin, supra note 85, at 687.
'02Id. at 689.

103
See PASSEL & COHN, supra note 84, at 6, 8 (noting that nearly half of all adult unauthorized
immigrants live with their children, in nuclear settings).
" Id. at 6.
05
MICHAEL HOEFFER, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REP. ON ESTIMATES OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009, at 4
(2010).

107Id. at 1-2.
'0s Id. at 3.
' Elmore, supra note 96, at 522.
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this perceived threat is hollow, since those same immigrants have, for the
past eight years, watched the industries to which they are tied crumble.
Construction workers were some of the first laborers to feel the effect
of the 2007-2009 recession.o Because of low interest rates and high
building rates in the 1970s and 1980s, the United States attracted a large
percentage of the more than fifteen percent of global immigrants in
construction,"' a notable departure from the patterns established for
immigration into the United States before the Great Depression. But the
heavy density of workers in construction created an even larger vacuum for
unauthorized immigrants as unemployment rose during the early years of
the recession. With the ability and desire to stay in certain locations even
without work,1 2 population stagnation has become a serious problem in
Southwestern states both for immigrants and for citizens.
C. The Legal Arizona Workers Act
It is no secret that legislatures can and have used failing labor markets
and population control as rationales for implementing non-explicit
immigration policies. In the 1970s, the House Judiciary Committee
legitimated its endorsement of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration
Act"l3 with the logic that the primary reason for the country's illegal alien
problems was the economic imbalance between the United States and the
countries from which the aliens were emigrating.' 14 This logic, and the
subsequent federal bills sanctioning the hiring of known unauthorized
immigrants by employers and restricting workforce opportunities for
undocumented workers throughout the 1970s,"' evidenced the growing
fear for American workers' security even in a rising economy. In today's
recession economy, the fear of non-citizen workers usurping jobs is
omnipresent, and is only exacerbated by the concentrated, increasingly
immobile unauthorized populations in failing industries.'' 6
On September 19, 2007, the Legal Arizona Workers Act, Arizona
Revised Statutes Section 23-212, went into effect.'" 7 The statute, similar to
110
Martin, supra note 85, at 676.
"1 Id
112Many states, including immigrant-heavy states such as New
York, Utah, and New Mexico,
allow unauthorized foreigners to obtain driver's licenses. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Population, States and
Cities, Integration, 14 MIGRATION NEWS (Oct. 2007), http://migration.ucdavis.edulmn/more.php?
id=3319 0 2_0 [hereinafter Univ. of Cal., Population].
1137 U.S.C. § 2045(f) (1976).
114Smith & Mendez, supra note 91, at 26.
"s See id. at 27 (displaying break-down statistics for H.R. 16,188 (1972); H.R. 8713 (1975); S.
561 (1975); S. 3074 (1976); S. 2252 (1977)).
116Elmore, supra note 96, at 528 ("[B]oundaries are a necessary condition to establish egalitarian
principles within the bounded community.").
" ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A) (2010) ("An employer shall not knowingly employ an
unauthorized alien. If, in the case when an employee uses a contract, subcontract, or other independent
contractor agreement to obtain the labor of an alien in this state, the employer knowingly contracts with
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California's Section 2615, focuses on those who transport and employ
unauthorized workers, rather than on the workers themselves. While such
legislation could appear as a practical approach to immigration regulation,
the statute came under attack for two primary reasons. First, as will be
discussed later in this Note, the statute's use of the federal definitions in
attempting to sanction Arizona employers was challenged as being
preempted by IRCA," 8 and, second, a hotly contested issue in both the
majority opinion and dissent in Whiting, the statutory provision is itself
discriminatory and violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
Section 23-212 is an amalgam of federal and state powers, which
together create a system of employer regulation. The statute outlines ways
an employer can "knowingly" employ unauthorized aliens, and gives
discretion to the state Attorney General to both prescribe a complaint form
on which a person can allege a knowing employment of unauthorized
aliens and verify the work authorization of an alleged unauthorized
alien."'9 While it is under the state Attorney General's discretion to
determine the authorization of an immigrant, the determination is made in
a federal framework. In investigating a complaint, the state Attorney
General verifies authorization pursuant to the process in the United States
Code.12 0 Under the Arizona statute, courts may only consider the federal
determination of whether an employee is an unauthorized alien pursuant to
the Code.12' Notification of the employment of an unauthorized alien is
then distributed to both local and federal authorities, and the federal
government's determination creates a rebuttable presumption of an
employee's lawful status.122 Thus, the statute attempts to balance the
federal definitions and procedures established under IRCA with its own
the unauthorized alien or with a person who employs or contracts with an unauthorized alien to perform
the labor, the employer violates this subsection.").
" Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
9
' ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-212(B)-(C).
120
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(1)(A) ("The person or entity must attest, under penalty of perjury and on a
form designated or established by the Attorney General by regulation, that it has verified that the
individual is not an unauthorized alien by examining: (i) a document described in subparagraph (B), or
(ii) a document described in subparagraph (C) and a document described in subparagraph (D). Such
attestation may be manifested by either a hand-written or an electronic signature. A person or entity
has complied with the requirement of this paragraph with respect to examination of a document if the
document reasonably appears on its face to be genuine. If an individual provides a document or
combination of documents that reasonably appears on its face to be genuine and that is sufficient to
meet the requirements of the first sentence of this paragraph, nothing in this paragraph shall be
construed as requiring the person or entity to solicit the production of any other document or as
requiring the individual to produce such another document.").
12' 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2006) ("The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by
law, by providing the requested verification or status information.").
122 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(H).
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desire to keep unauthorized workers from establishing a powerful presence
in the Arizona workforce.
The statute, however, faces both theoretical and practical problems.
Though it explicitly states that the Attorney General or county attorney
shall not investigate complaints that are based "solely on race, color or
national origin,"l2 3 the statute was created to control a population that is
defined by race, color, and national origin. There are up to 575,000
unauthorized immigrants in Arizona, and men aged eighteen to thirty-nine
make up thirty-five percent of the undocumented immigrant population.124
Mexicans constitute about fifty-five percent of the unauthorized population
in the United States, and in the construction industry alone, from the period
of 2007 to 2009, Latinos lost almost two hundred and fifty thousand
jobs.12 5 These statistics show how impossible blindness to race and
nationality is in a statute meant to restrict predominantly male, workingage Latinos. The statute is intended to create uniformity in the workforce
and to allow for accurate record keeping and wage distribution, 12 6 but
practically it excludes a population already struggling to find work in an
increasingly narrow job market.
Far from presenting unbiased legislation, Section 23-212 represents
Arizona's interest in criminalizing employers who hire undocumented
workers.12 7 This is an interest which is not out of the ordinary in many
states' recent legislation and which is indicative of the common "solution"
these states see to the issue of undocumented workers. This is a
remarkable shift from the individual-oriented attack strategy of the 1930s,
especially at the state level. Targeting and sanctioning employers on the
federal level has led to some of the largest mass arrests of unauthorized
workers in American history,12 8 but it has, almost exclusively, remained a
federal action. For the states to take the sanctioning of employers into their
own hands evidences the strong local anti-immigrant sentiments which
have resurfaced in the last decade.
While entire books have been written on the discriminatory effects of
IRCA and state employment sanctions, the purpose of this Note is to
explain the economic causes and effects of such legislation. While this
Note acknowledges social injustices, they are outside its scope. What is
pertinent to this Note, however, are the reactions that states had to IRCA.
123

Id

§ 23-212(B).

124PASSEL & COHN,

supra note 84, at 1,4.
KOCHAR, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, LATINO LABOR REPORT 2008: CONSTRUCTION
REVERSES JOB GROWTH FOR LATINOS, at ii (2008).
126 See Univ. of Cal., Population,supra
note 112.
' Ann Allott, Arizona and Illinois Laws (and Lawsuits) on Undocumented Workers, 2008
EMERGING ISSUES 980 (LEXIS) 1, 2 (2007).
128See Greg Brosnan & Jennifer Szymaszek, Guatemala: In the Shadow of the Raid,
PBS:
FRONTLINE WORLD (July 30, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/rough/2009/07/guatemala_
a_tal.html (discussing the effects of the Postville, Iowa raids).
125RAKESH
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Many states either echoed or followed Arizona's codification of what had
previously been only federal employer sanctions. But, in contrast, certain
traditionally immigrant-heavy states have proposed resolutions as a direct,
negative response to Arizona.129 Of particular note is California's Senate
Concurrent Resolution 113, which urges various state and private entities
to actually withhold financial support of Arizona businesses.130 The
resolution was introduced in June 2010, by then State Senator Gil Cedillo,
chairman of the Latino Legislative Caucus, in direct response to Sections
23-211 and 23-212. Concerned that the Arizona law is "divisive and
unconstitutional" Cedillo's resolution did not target humanitarian concerns
surrounding the statute, but rather focused its attention on economic
sanctions.131 It is particularly relevant that California state senators and
political analysts supported the resolution by citing concerns that the
Arizona legislation would violate ethnic minorities' rights, but
implemented it by urging economic boycotts by private businesses.13 2
California addresses the very heart of why the Arizona legislature
enacted Section 23-212: economic survival. Its reaction seems like an
extreme measure that could influence both the Arizona legislature and the
federal government in addressing the future implications of the statute.
Such a boycott, however, seems to create a similarly circular cause and
effect cycle to the statute itself, advantaging neither the state nor the
employees. It is undisputed that a good economy and ample jobs are the
most significant factors drawing immigrants into the southwestern states.
Even during the early years of the recession, the United States economy
outpaced the economies of central and South American countries. Thus,
the recession did not initially staunch the influx of undocumented workers
into the United States.'33 But as California's senators argued, the goal
should not be to promote so-called "plantation politics,"' 3 4 and revert to an
owner-worker model, as many argue conglomerate hiring of unauthorized
immigrants represents. Yet, withdrawing market stimulants from an
already failing economy does nothing to either promote better hiring
'See, e.g., S.C. Res. 113, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); H.R.J. Res. 119, 96th Gen.
Assemb., (Ill. 2010) (stating and describing policies opposite to Arizona's).
130Cal. S. Con. Res. 113 (2010).
131Patrick McGreevy, Steinberg Supports Arizona Boycott Resolution, POLITICAL,
(June 23,
2010, 3:35 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/califomia-politics/2010/06/steinberg-supportsarizona-boycott.html.
132Susan Ferriss, Forty-Four Lawmakers Back Arizona Boycott Legislation, CAPITOLALERT,
(June 23, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2010/06/forty-four-califlawmakers-co-.html.
13 See Gerald P. L6pez, UndocumentedMexican Migration:In Search ofa Just Immigration Law
and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 640 (1981) ("Where there is substantial economic disparity between
two adjoining countries and the potential destination country promotes, dejure or defacto, access to its
substantially superior minimal wage, that promotion encourages migrants reasonably to rely on the
continuing possibility of migration, employment, and residence. . .
134Ferriss, supra note
132.
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practices or to stimulate the economy.
Arizona's legislation is clearly caused by national, recession-driven
unemployment and the desire to preserve work opportunities for those who
are citizens of, and pay taxes to, the United States. California's response is
laudable on moral grounds, but potentially harmful to the very groups it
seeks to support. While California attempts to set itself apart from
Arizona, despite California having the largest immigrant population in the
country,' 35 its resolution only highlights the inextricable link between the
states in their implementation of confrontational immigration policies. It
also clarifies the need for a uniform federal policy that balances the
country's economic priorities in a severe recession with the interests of its
more than eleven million undocumented immigrants. 3 6
D. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
On September 17, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona's
decision that Revised Statutes Sections 23-211 through 23-216 were, on
their face, constitutional and not preempted by the IRCA savings clause. 137
On the same day, the Ninth Circuit decided the same issue in a different
case, again holding that the statutes were facially constitutional and not
preempted by federal law.138 On June 28, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari on three issues: (1) whether federal law (IRCA)
expressly preempts Arizona's sanctioning of employers for hiring
unauthorized workers; (2) whether Arizona's sanctioning is impliedly
preempted because it requires employers to use the E-Verify system where
it is expressly voluntary under federal law; and (3) whether the Arizona
statute is impliedly preempted because it undermines the "comprehensive
scheme" that Congress created to regulate the employment of aliens. 39
The Court consolidated the Ninth Circuit holdings in Candelaria and
Chicanos Por La Causa into Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, looking to
answer conclusively the questions brought up during the debates in states
such as California following the passage of Sections 23-211 through
23-216.140 After oral arguments on December 8, 2010, the Court took
almost five months to deliver its answer. On May 26, 2011, the Court, in a
'" S.C. Res. 113,2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010).

136U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION

RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009, at 2 (2010).
1' Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v.
138Chicanos Por La Causa,

Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1037-38 (2008).
Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008), amended and
superseded by Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2008).
13 Brief for Petitioner at i, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 624, 2010 WL 4569901
(2010) (No. 09-115); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 624, No. 09-115, 2010
WL 4569901, at *I (U.S. Nov. 15, 2010) (granting Solicitor General's motion to participate as amicus
curiaeon the above-mentioned issues).
' Brief for Petitioner, supranote 139, at 11.
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5-3 decision written by Chief Justice John Roberts, held in favor of the
Respondents and declared that the Legal Arizona Workers Act, as a
licensing statute, is within the savings clause of IRCA and therefore

constitutional.141
The decision has implications well beyond declaring the statute
constitutional. Instead of supporting a uniform federal power over
immigration, the decision relegates such power to the fifty states, allowing
each-as in the earliest history of immigration control in the United
States-to govern their own borders and regulate immigrants who threaten
their residents' safety (convicted criminals) or who threaten the local
economy (indigents). 42 Deciding for the Respondents, as this Note will
discuss below, does not concentrate immigration policy within federal
powers, solidifying the need, as President Obama noted during his
presidential campaign, for "comprehensive immigration reform so local
communities do not continue to take matters into their own hands."l 43
Instead, it allows the states to take advantage of, as the Whiting Petitioner
described it, the "gaping loophole"'" in IRCA's savings clause 45 and to
impose their own ideas as to what their economies can withstand and
exploit.
IV. THE FUTURE OF IMMIGRATION POLICY
The question of what to do with citizen migrant and non-citizen
immigrant workers has been at the forefront of both federal and state
legislation for the past century. Legislative emphasis has shifted away
from migrants as instruments of commerce toward a view of immigrants as
individuals whose documented status supersedes their usefulness to a state
economy. Still, questions of federalism-whether the federal government
or states should manage and regulate immigration-remain ever-present.
Arizona is at the forefront of the controversy surrounding such regulation,
but it is not alone in its frustration with the federal government's 1986
IRCA regulations.146 In the first three months of 2009 alone, over one
thousand immigration-related bills were passed across all fifty states.' 47
The federal government and the American people have not ignored these
bills.
'' Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115, 2011 WL 2039365, slip op. at 25-27 (U.S.
May 26,2011).
142Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century ofAmerican Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM.
L. REv. 1833, 1834, n.2-3 (1993).
143Stephen Dinan, Judge Overturns Hazleton's Law Targeting Illegals, WASH. TIMES, July 27,
2007, at AS.
' Brief for Petitioner, supra note 139, at 4.
1458 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
'" 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)-(b).
147 Brief for Petitioner, supra note
139, at 2.
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As discussed above, on April 23, 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer
signed Senate Bill 1070 into law, legalizing the strictest state antiimmigration legislation to date. 14 8 It immediately drew controversy;
opponents argued against the use of identification cards, quotas, and
employment verification. 149 While the bill drew criticism on social levels,
Section 23-212, the section in controversy before the Court in December
2010, was challenged for an entirely different reason. Section 23-212
sanctions employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, but uses
federal definitions and verification methods.o5 0 Attempting to operate
within IRCA's exclusion for licensing,' 5 ' Arizona's employer sanctions
attempt to control the flood of immigrant workers toward low-paying
jobs-an influx encouraged by both American employers and consumers.
Criticism of the bill for going beyond mere licensing, and therefore being
federally preempted, led to Chamberof Commerce v. Whiting.152
Though the IRCA regulations were created primarily to reform
agricultural economics throughout the country,' 3 states retained the ability
to impose sanctions and licensing laws despite federal preemption in all
areas of economic growth or recession.154 Since states' dissatisfaction with
federal regulation of immigration law is hardly a secret,"55 states pushing
the envelope on what constitutes "licensing" has remained an issue for the
last two decades since IRCA's inception. The primary issue has been one
1'
1"

Ferriss, supranote 132.
Cf Kris Korbach, Why Arizona Drew a Line, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at 31.

1s0 The

statute provides:

For a first violation ... the court: (a) Shall order the employer to terminate the
employment of all unauthorized aliens.
(b) Shall order the employer to be subject to a three-year probationary period
for the business location where the unauthorized alien performed work. During the
probationary period the employer shall file quarterly reports in the form provided in
§ 23-722.01 with the county attorney of each new employee who is hired by the
employer at the business location where the unauthorized alien performed work.
(c) Shall order the employer to file a signed sworn affidavit with the county
attorney within three business days after the order is issued. The affidavit shall state
that the employer has terminated the employment of all unauthorized aliens in this
state and that the employer will not intentionally or knowingly employ an
unauthorized alien in this state . . . . All licenses that are suspended under this
subdivision shall remain suspended until the employer files a signed sworn affidavit
with the county attorney ....
(d) May order the appropriate agencies to suspend all licenses described in
subdivision (c) of this paragraph that are held by the employer for not to exceed ten
business days ... .
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(F) (2010).
' 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) ("The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law
imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.").
52
1 No. 09-115, 2010 WL 4569901, at *1 (2010).
' Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 634 (2010)
(No. 09-115), 2010 WL 4974382.
54

Id.

15Id. at

46.
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of uniformity. IRCA's proposition, and the goal of immigration reform
since 1986, has been to create a cohesive front from which to combat
illegal entry and employment. States, while controlled by IRCA's
preemption clause, cite the Savings Clause of the Constitution 56 as
granting them the power to continue regulating immigration through the
giving and revoking of licenses in order to best serve their citizens and
These two goals-uniform federal control and local
economies.157
authority to license-are clearly at odds. The federalism loggerhead that
the Court faced in December 2010 was different than situations which it
had faced before: Instead of solely deciding the constitutionality of one
state statute, the Court had to determine the level of control that the federal
government should have in the face of widespread state disagreement with
federal methods of enforcement.
The federal government's argument in the case was a clear one:
Congress never intended to extend the power it vested with the Department
of Labor under IRCA to the states. 58 It claimed that Arizona, and any
state enacting similar legislation, was not enforcing federal law, but was
rather subsuming the federal definitions of undocumented and unverified
immigrants and using federally outlined verification procedures-most
notably the E-Verify system-as means to impose its own state sanctions
on state employers. The distinction for the purposes of constitutionality, as
argued by the federal government, lay in "tracking" federal laws as
opposed to "incorporating" them,s 9 an action which exceeds the exception
for licensing statutes as set out in IRCA's Section 1324a(h)(2).
"Tracking," as argued by the government, transforms the federal law into a
state law, therefore conflicting with IRCA and rendering the state law
preempted.
There was another concern imbedded in the federal government's
opposition to Arizona's legislation: discrimination. As the law stands, it
imposes sanctions for knowing or intentional hiring of undocumented
workers.' 60 While on its face such language may seem clear and
reasonable, the government argued that in practice it encouraged
widespread discrimination by employers. Rather than risk the possibility
of businesses being sanctioned or shut down under the statute, employers
could simply not hire anyone that looks or sounds like an immigrant. With
56U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.

5 Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 153, at 30-31.
' Id. at 19.
"9 1d. at 19-20.
' ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(A) (2010) ("An employer shall not knowingly employ an
unauthorized alien. If, in the case when an employer uses a contract, subcontract or other independent
contractor agreement to obtain the labor of an alien in this state, the employer knowingly contracts with
an unauthorized alien or with a person who employs or contracts with an unauthorized alien to perform
the labor, the employer violates this subsection.").
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more than five hundred thousand undocumented immigrants in Arizona
alone,' 6 ' determining who may or may not be an immigrant based on an
assumption is a significant problem, one that, according to the government,
the law does nothing to remedy.162 In fact, the government argued, the
Arizona legislation seems to even incentivize such discrimination with its
sanctions. 6 1 Senator Russell Pearce, one of the drafters of Section 23-212,
conceded that immigration policy is the "determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a
legal entrant may remain,"'1" and argued that the legislation does not
change the federal government's right to regulate such entry and exit.'6 1
Yet he did not concede that a state's laws are unbalanced and flawed if
they punish an employer for openly discriminating against a significant
population in the state but encourage employers to secretly discriminate
because they cannot know for certain a person's immigration status.
Though the law says that an enforcement official cannot pursue a
complaint of knowing employment based on race alone,'" it does nothing
to account for an employer simply refusing to hire anyone who is not white
out of fear of a violation. The argument against such implicit allowance
was at the heart of the Petitioner's challenge.
Arizona's response spoke to the myriad ways in which a state's
immigration law can function within federal law while maintaining the
state's sovereignty. The state's strongest argument, which was ultimately
upheld by the Court, was that its authority is determined by the nature of
the sanction it wishes to impose. 66 A state assumes full accountability in
establishing policies to govern the issuing or revocation of licenses.' 68 In
essence, Arizona's argument was that the large populations of
undocumented workers have a greater local than federal impact,
necessitating some local control, and that the state, under IRCA's savings
clause, has been given that control.' 69 To further augment its claim for
control, Arizona contended that its regulations do not frustrate federal law,
but rather enhance it, using its framework to maximize local effectiveness.
Rather than focus on the social and economic ramifications of its
decision, the Court decided the case on strict textualist terms. Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, stated clearly that the Court took into
...
PASSEL & COHN, supranote 84, at v.
162Transcript

of Oral Argument, supranote 153, at 32-33.

1'3 Id. at 33.
'" Brief of Senator Russell Pearce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at *7, Chamber
of Commerce v. Whiting, 2010 WL 4312793, No. 09-115 (Oct. 28, 2010).
'65 Id.
6 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-212(B) (2010) ("The attorney general or county attorney shall not
investigate complaints that are based solely on race, color or national origin.").
6' Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 153, at 31.
168Id.
16 Id. at 32.
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account the plain language of the statute alone, and determined, based on
that language, that the statute was a licensing statute within the savings
clause of IRCA.170 Though the government argued against "tracking," the
Court supported what it called "parroting.""'7 Rather than conflict with
IRCA, the Court maintained that a state statute that includes and builds on
express federal provisions functions in tandem with federal law, remaining
constitutional even when creating autonomous state powers. 7 2 Notably,
the Court clearly rejected the government's argument that "licensing" must
be read narrowly, and pertain only to business licenses.17 3 Instead, directly
rebutting Justice Breyer's and Justice Sotomayor's dissents in the majority
opinion, Roberts placed the statute "well within" IRCA's licensing
allowance and asked, hypothetically, how the dissenting Justices could
read questions into IRCA's text when Congress had intentionally neglected
to narrow the focus of its provisions at the time of its signing. 174 While the
5
Court addressed the issues of discrimination and unfair hiring practices,"
it dismissed the possibility of their existence, relying on Arizona
businesses to take the "most rational path."' 76
V. CONCLUSION
Though the Court attempted to cleanly refute the arguments that
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor made in their dissents, it is difficult to
refrain from second-guessing a decision so closely decided and so clearly
divided on party lines. This Note does not contend that a decision for the
Petitioner would have had any less of an impact on the federalism balance
in immigration law than the decision for the Respondents, or any less of a
socio-economic impact. While the recession which began in 2007 has
since receded and market projections on Wall Street are once again
climbing, 7 7 many businesses have not recovered, and may never.
Arizona's predominantly white middle-class businessmen run many of
A decision for the Petitioner, the United States
these businesses.
Government, would, arguably, have stripped business owners of the ability
to directly effect their own hiring practices though state-level politics by
firmly placing the authority over regulating undocumented immigration
170Chamber

of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115,2011 WL 2039365, slip op. at 9-10 (U.S. May

26,2011).
"' Id. at 10.
2
..Id. at 12.

"' Id. at 14-15 n.6.
"4Id. ("If we are asking questions, a more telling one may be why, if Congress had intended such
limited exceptions to its prohibition on state sanctions, it did not simply say so, instead of exception
'licensing and similar laws' generally?").
' Id. at 21.
16
7 id.
7 Kevin O'Leary, The Great Recession: Will Construction Workers Survive?, TIME, Feb. 6,
2010, availableat http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1960639,00.html.

"MEN MADE IT, BUT THEY CAN'T CONTROL IT"

2011]

I1673

entirely with federal officials.
The goal of government programs in the Depression, such as those in
which Edwards's brother-in-law and the majority of blue-collar laborers
worked,178 was to stimulate failing markets while keeping workers
enthusiastic and occupied. In the wake of the present recession, however,
such occupation is simply not possible, and the stimulus needed to
regenerate the job market to levels experienced during the housing boom
of the 1990s and early 2000s is unlikely to come from banks fighting
bailout schemes and continuing to cut mortgage loans. Without additional
stimulus, the construction industry cannot hope to regain its former
strength, and those workers who relied on the construction boom of the
past twenty years have no assurance that the same level of work will ever
return. Despite creating a uniform policy to cover all businesses-whether
the business is failing or growing-a decision for the Petitioner would
have been unlikely to have a purely positive effect.
Similarly, bringing all state employer verification processes under
IRCA's umbrella would have taken the power of decision-making away
from those whom the decisions affect most. Section 23-212 is not
expressly attempting to regulate the coming and going of undocumented
immigrants. Its sole purpose, as explained by Respondents' counsel at oral
argument in December 2010 (an explanation with which the Court agreed),
is to allow Arizona employers to determine whether their workers are
undocumented and to allow law enforcement officials to determine which
employers are not requiring documentation.17 9 IRCA's purpose is greater
and more general than the state statute's. 8 0 While IRCA must account for
regulation of immigration at every border in the United States, Section 23212 only looks to Arizona's border and its industries. Arizona is a
traditionally high immigration state,' 8 ' and is not unfamiliar with the
effects of immigration policy since 1986. Putting Arizona, however,
exclusively under IRCA's authority for matters that concern not only
immigration policy but also Arizona's local economic policy could lead to
a stifling of independent growth. It is this growth that is exactly the type
that could regenerate a failed economy when large-scale capital is not
available. IRCA does not have the authority to affect, and was not
designed to deal with, economic restructuring. Nonetheless, a decision for
the Petitioner would have placed that role squarely on IRCA's and the
federal government's shoulders. Without the infrastructure to create
government programs such as those available to 1930s migrant workers,
178Edwards

v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 161 (1941); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., supra note 65, at 10.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 153, at 54.
's See id. at 55 (stating Arizona's understanding that Congress does have preemption power with
IRCA, but that it left discretion of narrow issues to the states).
17

"' PASSEL & COHN, supranote 84, at 1.
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instituting a blanket federal policy might have only further diminished any
opportunity for unemployed construction workers to resume their prerecession production, and could have propagated the current stagnation of
unemployed, undocumented immigrants in southwestern states such as
Arizona.
The decision for the Respondents, however, likely will do similarly
little to cure the failing construction economy and the pooling of
unemployed, undocumented workers. It is, of course, impossible to predict
the exact ramifications of the Court's decision, but the decision represents
a wholesale change in the federalism balance under which states and the
federal government have operated for the past twenty-five years. Allowing
states to regulate immigration independently could create a patchwork of
isolated state regulations. Though the Court clearly stated in Edwards
decades ago that states could not explicitly regulate the movement of
citizens, it has yet to determine how a state can regulate the movement of
non-citizens. The decision for the Respondents will, in practice, authorize
states to passively affect population movement. It is unlikely that any state
will want workers who have limited skills and who are underrepresented in
tax brackets flooding already tight markets. Each attempt to limit such
population movement could further alienate states from each other and
could undermine IRCA's attempt to unify immigration policy in the United
States. The Court's decision does not address this concern, and instead
allows states, so long as they do it through the act of licensing, to
independently shape their own (and the country's) immigration policies
and therefore shape the migration patterns of undocumented workers
across the United States.
The Court's decision will have a certain but unknown impact on future
state laws and policies surrounding the hiring of undocumented
If the
immigrants, well beyond the Legal Arizona Workers Act.
construction or services industries begin to speed up in states where
immigration has not previously been high, movement to those states by
unemployed immigrant workers could result in the enactment of legislation
even more stringent than Arizona's. A decision for the Respondents gives
any state authority to enact restrictions and impose sanctions similar to
Arizona's. Until and unless the Court declares such regulations and
sanctions to be preempted by federal law, the boundaries of state authority
to regulate the economic futures of non-citizen immigrants are wideranging and ambiguously defined.
Though the Court declined to address the social issues raised by the
government's argument and in Justice Breyer's dissent,182 the concern over

82 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115, 2011 WL 2039365, slip op. at 20-22 (U.S.
May 26, 2011) ("The Chamber and Justice Breyer assert that employers will err on the side of
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the impact of the decision on state hiring practices remains. The holding
for the Respondents left untouched the implicit endorsement of
discrimination that exists in the Legal Arizona Workers Act. As
mentioned above, one of the major concerns surrounding Arizona's
Section 23-212 is its passive encouragement of discrimination
The
predominantly against Latino men in blue-collar labor positions.'
majority abruptly disregards the possibility in favor of the "rational"
decisions it expects businesses to make under the law.184 Yet while the
decision facially negates the problem, in practice it may sanction such
discrimination. While Arizona's statute may give individual employers
more freedom to control their own hiring practices and may allow state law
enforcement to manage the hiring of undocumented immigrants in
response to local needs, such a decision would put Arizona out of step with
what seems to be the stance of other immigration-heavy states.18 Such
discrepancies could alienate states from each other, and encourage
populations to move into states where sanctions are less stringent and
employers are more willing to take risks hiring undocumented workers.
While the mass migrations that occurred in the 1930s have not yet been
repeated, the decision for the Respondents could result in such a
movement, forcing states today to emulate California's "Anti-Okie Law,"
with an added allowance for businesses to discriminate in order to avoid
sanctions. Faced with the prospect of losing his livelihood, it seems naive
to blindly believe a business owner will always make the "most rational"l 86
decision.
Of final importance, one cannot ignore the positions taken by each
Justice when determining the lasting significance of this decision both in
terms of stare decisis power and of the impact outside of the courtroom.
Whiting is only one .of the first eleven cases from which Justice Kagan
recused herself because of her participation as acting Solicitor General.187
Due to the government's position taken in the brief submitted during her
tenure (though written by the now-acting Soliticor General, Neal Kumar
Katyal), in addition to her own record since joining the bench, it is possible
to hypothesize that she would have added her vote to Justices Breyer,
discrimination rather than risk the 'business death penalty' by hiring unauthorized workers ... That is
not the choice.").
18 Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 153, at 33.
1 Whiting, No. 09-115, at 21.
as E.g., S.C. Res. 113, 2009-2010 Leg. (Cal. 2010); H.J. Res. 119, 96th General Assemb. (Ill.
2010); see also Patrick McGreevy, Steinberg Supports Arizona Boycott Resolution, L.A. TIMES,
PolitiCal, (June 23, 2010, 3:35 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/2010/06/
steinberg-supports-arizona-boycott.html (describing California's legislative effort to protest Arizona's
Section 23-212).
..Whiting, No. 09-115, at 21.
187Tony Mauro, Kagan Recuses in 10 More Cases, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 13,
2010,
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202471922596&streturn=&hbxlogin=l.
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Ginsburg, and Sotomayor's, making the final count 5-4. Her recusal,
while not ultimately changing the outcome of the case, adds it to the list of
recent cases decided seemingly on close, political lines. A 5-4 outcome
would show the instability of the decision, and prominently display the
sharp split between those who decided the case on narrow, academic
premises and those who wished to expand the decision beyond academia
into social policy. But, there is of course the possibility that Justice Kagan
might have voted the other way. The Chamber of Commerce, also the
Petitioner in this case, did not endorse her during her confirmation process,
an almost unprecedented occurrence and a clear statement from an impactheavy section of the American business leadership.'8 8 It is inconclusive
evidence, but such indecision begs the question of Justice Kagan's position
on local businesses and states' power to regulate them. While party lines
would seem to dictate that she would rule against them for the government
in this case, she has not established a clear-cut stance on business, and it is
possible that her decision, like Justice Kennedy's, could have been swayed
by the majority's decision to allow states to regulate licenses. Ultimately
an academic, Justice Kagan may well have agreed with the limited, textual
reading of the statute and favored an intellectual outcome rather than a
social one. For the time being, the question is moot, but its answer is not
irrelevant.
With further challenge to other sections of Arizona's
immigration legislation up for certioraripresently, and innumerable other
state statutes in the making, she may very well have a chance to assert her
position in the near future.
In the end, there were significant downsides to a decision for either
Petitioner or Respondents.
With the economy, social policy, and
federalism itself on the line, can, and more importantly, should the Court
be able to limit its discussion to the academic, ignoring the social
ramifications of its own pedagogy? It is a valid criticism of both Justice
Breyer's and Justice Sotomayor's dissents that they focus on hypothetical
future implications rather than on the concrete data offered by the
Petitioner and the Respondents, but it is an equally valid criticism of the
majority that it ignores future immigration issues because of their
hypothetical status, despite the very real possibility of their occurrence.
Whiting, for now, stands as a testament to the Court's unwillingness to
limit state immigration regulation under IRCA. But, as the economy
continues to shift and struggle, and as states react to Arizona's legislation,
it is impossible to say just how long that testament will endure.

Carrie Levine, U.S. Chamber Doesn't Endorse Kagan, BLT: BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Aug. 2,
2010, 4:25 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/08/us-chamber-doesnt-endorse-kagan.html.
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